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ABSTRACT
Because design is a practice, a theory of design is not possible in the same
sense as a theory of chemistry is. Socio-psychological theories of what designers
do are not design theories. Knowledge of how to design cannot be reduced to
theory, for reasons that grow out of the philosophy of science. This paper
suggests, however, that there can be a theory of design in the sense of supporting
theory, drawn from other disciplines, that employs a level or style of analysis that
is uniquely suited to design practice. In particular, design theory might involve
incompletely described objects or teleological explanation, since these are key
features of design, and since the design process can be understood as moving
from a functional description to a physical description of an object.
INTRODUCTION
The notion of a theory of design is
problematic because design, like medicine or
management, is a practice. Whereas chemistry
or physics is defined by a set of phenomena it
is assigned to study, design is defined by a task
it is assigned to do. Chemical theory is clearly
possible because one can organize one’s
knowledge of chemical phenomena in a
systematic way. But it is not obvious that one
can reduce knowledge of design practice to
theory. I will argue that it is impossible to do
this, for reasons that derive from a body of
thought in the philosophy of science. I do not
dispute that one can theorize about design
practice in the sense that one can theoretically
understand
the
socio-psychological
phenomenon of design. But this, I will argue,

does not issue in design theory. My claim is
that one cannot theoretically organize one’s
knowledge of how to design.
Despite this negative conclusion, I will
identify a sense in which design theory is
possible. Practical arts like design, medicine,
and engineering are typically assisted by
supporting theories that provide techniques
and a basic understanding of the phenomenon
one is trying to influence. These theories are
generally part of other sciences. But a
supporting theory may investigate a
phenomenon, or employ a level or style of
analysis, that is unique to the practice in
question. At an extreme, one could say that
even chemical theory is a supporting theory
uniquely suited to the practice of chemistry,
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albeit one that does not reduce to theory all the
knowledge required to practice chemistry.
The possibility of design theory, then,
turns on whether there are theoretical styles or
subject matters that support design practice
and are uniquely associated with it. I will
suggest that there are. But on this
understanding, design theory is in its infancy,
and my rumination about what it might
become must be treated as speculation.
I begin below with a brief discussion of
what is meant by “theory.” After an even
briefer definition of “design,” I argue that a
socio-psychological understanding of the
design process is important but is not design
theory. I then argue at some length that one
cannot reduce practical design knowledge to
theory. But this leaves open the possibility that
there are supporting theories unique to design,
and I suggest ways in which these can arise
from the need to understand the behavior of
incompletely described objects, which are
characteristic of design. In particular, I discuss
the potential for design theory in
computational models, design representations,
optimization
models,
and
empirical
investigations. I also point out that since part
of what it means to design is to concoct a
functional or teleological explanation of the
resulting artifact, teleological theories can play
a special role in design. I defend the notion of
teleological explanation and suggest how it
might lead to design theories.
I make no attempt to survey
systematically the literature that might be
relevant to design theory. Several useful
surveys can be found in the literature (Cross,
Naughton and Walker 1980; Hubka 1980;
Simon 1969; Suh 1990).

WHAT IS THEORY?
A theory is an explanatory account of
the way things are. This means that a theory is
not number of things it is commonly taken to
be.
What Theory Is Not
A theory is not (necessarily)
unsubstantiated. We colloquially contrast
“theory” and “fact,” as though a theory is
speculative and a fact is established. This is
wrong on several levels. First, it makes a
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category mistake, since it confuses a
description with what is described. A theory is
an account of the way things are, whereas a
fact is the way things are. Second, a fact need
not be established. If there are sixteen
inhabited planets in the galaxy, then this is a
fact whether we know about it or not. Third, a
theory (i.e., its truth) may be quite firmly
established, as is Maxwell’s theory of
electromagnetism.
A theory is more than a conceptual
framework, even though it uses one, and even
though a conceptual framework is theoryladen in the sense that it divides up the world
in a particular way. The Linnaeus system of
species, genera, etc., is not a theory, because it
makes no explicit claims. Rather, one uses it to
make claims, as for instance, “Homo

CONTRIBUTION
A number of practical sciences are
centered on design, whether it be the design of
physical artifacts, software, organizations, or
information systems. This raises the issue of
whether there can in fact be a science of design
with a theoretical basis.
This paper maintains that there cannot be
a theory of design in the same sense that there is
a theory of physics or chemistry. It draws on the
thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Willard Quine,
Hans Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas to
show that a practice, such as design, cannot be
reduced to theory because practice is essentially
pretheoretical. The argument is based partly on
Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis:
without pretheoretical discourse to supply the
concepts explained by theories, there would be
no way to understand what it means for
competing
theories
to
offer
different
explanations of the same phenomenon.
On the other hand, there can be a
supporting theory that is uniquely associated
with a practice, even if it does not explain the
practice itself. For instance, chemical theory is
uniquely associated with the practice of
chemistry (understood as what chemists do in
the laboratory), even though it does not
completely explain why or how they do it.
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australopithecus is extinct.” A framework or
“tool” developed for an artificial intelligence
system, such as a semantic net or a graph
grammar, is not a theory, because it is neither
true nor false. This is not to deny that a
conceptual framework develops hand-in-hand
with theory. We use the Linnaeus system
because animals and plants actually come in
species, and because evolutionary theories at
least partially explain their occurrence. One’s
choice of conceptual framework has
theoretical implications, because the way we
categorize the world is intimately related to
our understanding of what the world is like.
But to propound a theory is not only to choose
a framework but to say things within the
framework as well.
What Theory Is
Theory represents our efforts to make
the world intelligible. It must not only tell us
how things are, but why things are as they are.
Engineers, for example, use a number of
empirical formulas that predict the resistance
to flow through a pipe. These formulas do not
represent a theory because they do not explain
why resistance varies with flow rate as it does.
On the other hand, the D’Arcy-Weisbach
formula, which states that the resistance varies
with the square of the flow rate, reflects a
theoretical understanding of Newtonian fluids.
A closely related property of theories is
that their claims have a lawlike (or “nomic”)
character. Nelson Goodman’s famous “grue”
example illustrates this (Goodman 1965). Let
something be “grue” if it is green until the year
2010 and blue thereafter. If I observe the color
of grass in 2004, I can conclude that grass is
green but not that it is grue. The reason is that
we do not consider “grass is grue” a nomic
statement, whereas “grass is green” is
connected with the order of nature.
Lawlikeness is closely connected with the
notion of explanation because, ultimately, the
way we tell whether a statement is nomic is by
whether it fits into a system of statements that
can help make the world intelligible.
My examples so far deal with empirical
theories, but similar points apply to
mathematical theories. Euclid’s Elements
might be characterized as a theory of geometry
because it elucidates geometrical ideas,
showing how they relate to each other. It is

important to note, however, that it is not the
theorem-proof format of Euclid’s work that
makes it a theory. In fact there seems to be a
prevalent idea that theorizing consists of
axiomatizing a field and proving theorems.
One can certainly deduce the consequences of
statements in a theory, and to this extent one
can in a sense “prove theorems” in any theory.
But Euclid proved theorems in order to
elucidate the structure of geometry, and it is
the elucidation, not the theorem-proving, that
makes it a theory.

WHAT IS DESIGN?
Design is a passage from a functional
description to a physical description of an
artifact. That is, when the one begins with a
description of what a thing is supposed to do
and produces a physical description of a thing
that does it, then one is designing.
The term “physical description” is a bit
too narrow, since one can design such
nonphysical things as software, organizations,
information systems, and even theories. But I
think it good practice to let the design of
physical artifacts stand as the paradigmatic
case of design, so that other types of design are
design insofar as they resemble the design of
physical objects.

WHAT IS DESIGN THEORY?
A fundamental fact about design that
complicates theoretical treatment is that design
is a practice. Design theory must therefore
organize our knowledge of design practice.
But “knowledge of design practice” has two
very different senses that seem often to be
confused. It can refer to knowledge about the
socio-psychological phenomenon of designing,
or knowledge one must have in order to
practice design.
What Design Theory Is Not
When the phrase “design theory” is
mentioned, what seems often to be meant is a
socio-psychological theory of the designing
phenomenon. This in turn can be either of two
basic types.
One type investigates the process by
which people actually generate designs. What
steps do designers generally follow? How did
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they learn their craft? When several people
produce a design, how do they interact? There
is no reason one cannot build a theory around
these questions, at least to the extent that one
can build psychological and sociological
theories of any kind. A good deal of effort has
already been exerted in this direction, much of
it based on analysis of “protocols,” or records
of what designers say when they talk to each
other or are asked to “think aloud” (Ericsson
and Simon 1980).
One can also ask what would happen if
people designed differently—a search program
described by John Dixon (Dixon 1987). In
particular, one would like to know what
factors lead to good designs, where the
criterion of “goodness” is defined in advance
(efficiency, cost, robustness, or whatever). I
take efforts to formulate “design procedure” or
“steps to follow when designing” to be part of
this research program.
Socio-psychological theories of these
kinds are legitimate and important and can
help one know how to design. But they are not
the same as knowledge of how to design. One
can know much about how to design while
knowing very little about how designers (other
than oneself) actually behave. Conversely, one
can know much about what designers do and
little about how to design, particularly if other
designers know equally little!
There is a significant sense in which the
socio-psychological theories are not theories
of design at all. They are like theories of how
chemists practice their science, or what would
happen if they practiced it differently. One
could study how chemists behave in the
laboratory, how they keep records, how they
design experiments, how they train their
apprentices, and so on. In other words, one can
treat the practice of chemistry as a
phenomenon to be studied, one that is quite
distinct from the chemical phenomena studied
by chemistry. One can also ask how chemistry
should be practiced, and chemists have in fact
evolved certain practices that seem to work.
The practice of chemistry is actually
served by several supporting sciences, of
which chemistry itself is only one. A chemist
uses mass spectrometers, for instance, whose
operation relies on optics and quantum
physics. Computer science and discrete
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mathematics are helpful in the identification of
isomers, and so on. A socio-psychological
theory of chemical practice could be viewed as
one of these supporting theories. By helping us
to understand how chemists think and how
they interact with each other, it could improve
the practice of chemistry. But it would not be a
theory of chemistry.
In a similar sense the practice of design
can have supporting sciences. In engineering
design, for instance, one appeals to physics
and materials science to determine whether a
proposed bridge will fall down. Sociopsychological theories of the design process
can comprise another supporting science. But
again, they are not theories of design.
What Design Theory Is
I now seem to have reached an impasse.
I distinguished design theory from sociopsychological theories of design practice. But
since design is a practice, a theory of design
must be a theory of design practice, and it is
unclear how one can have a theory of a
practice except in a socio-psychological sense.
Chemistry is free of this difficulty, because it
is associated with a set of phenomena (i.e.,
chemical phenomena) distinct from the
phenomenon of chemical practice. But design
seems to have no such set of associated
phenomena.
One can attempt either of two escapes
from this impasse. One is to insist that it is
possible to understand a practice theoretically
in a way that does not reduce to sociopsychological theories. That is, one can
develop a theoretical ordering of practical
knowledge. Another is to show that design,
like chemistry, has its own subject matter after
all—even if it is not so obvious what it is.
I will argue below that the first avenue
of escape is blocked by considerations put
forward by philosophers of science.
The second possible avenue of escape
in effect claims that design practice calls for
supporting theories that are peculiar to design.
The theory of chemistry is not only a
“supporting theory” for the practice of
chemistry, but one that is uniquely tied to that
practice. In other words, among the theories
useful for chemical practice are those whose
subject matter is particularly associated with
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chemical practice (i.e., chemical theories), or
whose type of analysis or level of abstraction
is uniquely suited to chemical practice. The
claim here is that the same is true for design
practice.

IRREDUCIBILITY OF PRACTICAL
KNOWLEDGE TO THEORY
The issue as to whether one can
understand a practice theoretically is one of
the central questions addressed by a school of
philosophy developed in the1970s and 1980s
by Jürgen Habermas, Hans Georg Gadamer,
Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein, and others
(Habermas 1975, Gadamer 1975, Rorty 1979).
Bernstein provides a discussion of this
literature (Bernstein 1983). These thinkers
argue at length that practical knowledge is
logically prior to theoretical knowledge, and
that it makes no sense to speak of
understanding practice theoretically. I cannot
convey here the full scope of this body of
thought, of which social criticism is an
important component. But I can say something
about its reasons for denying that practice can
be theoretically understood.
I begin with a distinction, originally
drawn by the ancient Greeks (notably
Aristotle), between three types of knowledge:
techne, episteme and phronesis. Techne is
technical know-how, and episteme is
theoretical knowledge. Phronesis might best
be translated as judgment, or the ability to
apply techne and episteme to a practical
problem.
Suppose a physician encounters a
patient who appears to have appendicitis. The
physician knows how to examine the patient,
which tests to order, and how to remove the
appendix if necessary. This is techne. The
physician is also well schooled in anatomy,
pathology, and histology, and knows the
etiology of the disease and its effect on bodily
systems. This is episteme. But determining
whether the patient really has appendicitis is
another matter. The patient may not have all
the symptoms, the laboratory tests could be
borderline, and the patient’s own account
uncertain or even self-contradictory. There
may be no time to obtain more definitive tests
before the organ ruptures. At this point the

physician must exercise judgment. This is
phronesis.
Phronesis, then, is the ability to use
one’s theoretical knowledge (episteme) to
determine which technique (techne) to use. It
is where theory and practice meet. Good
judgment generally takes much longer to
acquire than theoretical knowledge or
technical know-how, perhaps the better part of
a lifetime. Apparently it cannot be taught, but
obtained only by experience, preferably under
the supervision of an expert.
Phronesis clearly relies on techne and
episteme. Judgment without technical knowhow is impotent (a surgeon without a scalpel).
Judgment without theory may be ineffective,
as is some folk medicine, and judgment with
bad theory can be even worse. (Think of
bloodletting, for which patients once traveled
long distances to find a skilled and
experienced practitioner). But even though
phronesis relies on techne and episteme, it is
reducible to neither.
I first dispose of two bad arguments for
the irreducibility of phronesis. One argument
draws the distinction between knowing that
and knowing how. “Knowing that” is
propositional knowledge; that is, knowing that
something is true. “Knowing how” is a skill;
that is, knowing how to do something. One
might maintain that phronesis involves
knowing how, whereas episteme does not. For
instance, phronesis involves observational
skills (ability to assimilate details and
distinguish the ones that matter), and the
ability to reasoning clearly under the pressure
of the moment. Thus phronesis is irreducible
to episteme.
But the irreducibility of phronesis does
not concern the irreducibility of “knowing
how” to “knowing that.” If Habermas and
company are simply telling us that possessing
a skill is different from possessing
propositional knowledge, their claim is trivial
and uninteresting. They claim, rather, that the
propositional component of phronesis is
irreducible to the propositional component of
episteme. In fact, they maintain that it is on
phronesis that all propositional knowledge is
ultimately based.
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Another bad argument for the
irreducibility of phronesis is that people who
know the theory and have the “how to” skills
sometimes do not know what to do in a
concrete situation. So there must be more to
phronesis than theoretical knowledge. But one
can explain this inability without supposing
the phronesis is irreducible. For instance, the
theory may be incomplete. If blood tests do
not determine whether the patient has
appendicitis, it may be because we are not
fully aware of the effect of appendicitis on
blood chemistry. Alternatively, the “boundary
conditions” may not be fully known. Given
enough information about the patient’s
symptoms, theory predicts reliably whether he
or she has appendicitis, but perhaps the patient
does not report all symptoms, or perhaps the
blood tests were not carefully done.
The philosophical arguments for
irreducibility go deeper than these. One of
them springs from the observation that while
scientific worldviews come and go, much of
everyday, common-sense discourse stays the
same. Scientists themselves dwell in this “life
world” of everyday knowledge while they
work on their theories. Everyday discourse is
therefore pretheoretical, the source from which
scientific theories spring.
This theme was echoed by such
“postmodern” thinkers as Wittgenstein, Quine,
Habermas, Rorty, and Gadamer (see
Wittgenstein 1958; Quine 1960, 1961; Quine
and Ullian 1970). It is best known from
Thomas Kuhn’s argument that science
undergoes “paradigm shifts” so radical that
theories before the shift are in some sense
incommensurable with theories after the shift
(Kuhn 1970). One way in which they are
incommensurable is that a theoretical
statement, such as “light travels in straight
lines,” may assume a new meaning in the new
paradigm; in this case, euclidean straight lines
became
noneuclidean
straight
lines
(geodesics). This alone is not upsetting, but (to
seize on Quine’s way of putting it) there may
be no translation from the old language into
the new. There may be no way to pick a claim
in the old paradigm, translate it into the new
language, and check whether it remains true in
the new paradigm. This is because a statement
in the old paradigm receives its meaning from
the role it plays in the scientific discourse of
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that paradigm, where by “discourse” I mean
not only linguistic behavior but how it
interacts with other types of behavior.
Yet there is a sense in which all of the
theories talk about many of the same things,
namely the things in our everyday experience
that they attempt to explain. They talk about
light and darkness, heat and cold, the sun and
the moon. This is possible only if these words
receive their meanings from some overarching
discourse (or “form of life,” to use
Wittgenstein’s phrase) that endures through
changes in scientific worldview. This is the
everyday discourse that embodies our
common-sense understanding of the world, the
practical knowledge that gets us through the
day. It is the praxis that provides the
foundation for theoria.
The
irreducibility
of
practical
knowledge to theory explains our intuition that
medicine or design is an “art” as well as a
“science.” To build medical science or design
science one must develop scientific knowledge
that supports the practice of medicine or
design, and is uniquely associated with it, but
does not transform the practice itself into a
science.

TOWARD THEORIES OF DESIGN
I now turn to the task of identifying a
set of problem areas whose systematic study
could yield theories uniquely associated with
design practice. Again, the problem of
understanding
the
socio-psychological
phenomenon of design is not one of them,
since it is most appropriately treated as part of
sociology, psychology, cognitive science, or
some combination of these. But I will discuss
three subject areas, or types of theoretical
analysis, that could lead to sciences of design.
These are computational models of design,
understanding the properties of incompletely
specified objects, and teleological explanation.
Computational Models
If the study of the concrete designing
phenomenon is not peculiarly a design science
because it focuses on the behavior and
interaction of human beings, perhaps one can
obtain a design science by removing the
human element. That is, rather than ask what
happens when humans follow certain design
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procedures, one can ask what happens when
computers do. When one specifies procedures
for humans to follow, it remains unclear what
will happen when humans in fact follow them.
This calls for empirical investigation of human
beings. But when one specifies what
procedures computers are to follow, then one
need not study the machines that carry out the
procedures. One need only study the
procedures themselves. Perhaps one can
develop theories that explain and predict what
sort of designs will issue from certain types of
procedures. Dixon refers to these as
“computational models” of design (Dixon
1987).
This
maneuver,
however,
only
postpones the question of what design science
is. Presumably when one studies design
algorithms, one does not study them qua
algorithms, as a computer scientist would. One
is not primarily interested in the finiteness or
complexity of the algorithms. One is interested
in the “content” of the algorithms, namely
what they reveal about the nature of design.
But what is this content?
There is a sense in which one can
theoretically understand a class of algorithms
in a content-specific way. This is the project of
formalist mathematics, as characterized by
David Hilbert, which studies number theory,
for instance, by investigating how its theorems
follow from the Peano axioms. Thus
computational design theory might be viewed
as a branch of formalist mathematics. (There
is, incidentally, a branch of mathematics called
“design theory,” but it is a very specialized
branch of geometry that only peripherally
relates to our interests here.) Yet the appeal of
the computational model may derive precisely
from an assumption that it is not to be
regarded as formalist mathematics. Hilbert
notwithstanding, there is a sense in which
Euclid not only studied the formal syntactic
properties of a geometric proof system (if at
all) but studied geometry. He studied the
properties of objects in a certain kind of space.
I am presupposing a certain kind of Platonism
here, but I think it is this same presupposition
that makes computational models for design
attractive. What one hopes to understand by
studying computational models is not the
formal structure of design algorithms, but
design. This assumes, of course, that there is

an underlying subject matter that a study of
design algorithms might organize in the way
that Euclid’s axiomatic treatment organized
geometry. It is yet to be determined what this
underlying subject matter is.
New Levels of Description
A characteristic and remarkable trait of
design is that it deals with incompletely
described objects. An architect, for instance,
may work with schematic representations of a
building and leave the smaller details to
engineers and construction firms. This
suggests a type of theory that may be unique to
design. Whereas science normally studies real,
concrete objects, design science would study
the properties and behavior of incompletely
described objects.
This proposal requires careful analysis.
To begin with, all science abstracts certain
features of an object and more or less ignores
the rest. In fact, the sciences are defined and
distinguished partially by the level and type of
abstraction they employ. So, if the proposal is
that design science focus on only certain
features of an object—namely, those
belonging to the designer’s incomplete
description of it—then it would seem to be no
different in principle from any other sort of
science.
But design practice may well call for
different levels or types of abstraction than the
other sciences. In this way it can inspire
theories that are uniquely suited to design.
Theories Arising from Design Representations
A design science can be strongly
influenced by the way that designs are
represented, since the choice of representation
determines what aspects of the artifact are
considered. Some recent developments in
design representations may in fact embody
some nascent design theories, although it must
always be remembered that a representation
alone, or any kind of conceptual framework
alone, does not comprise a theory.
A graph grammar or shape grammar,
for instance, pays attention to certain
geometrical properties of an object. One could
conceivably build a geometrical theory that
understands the structure of objects at this
level of abstraction, much as topologists have
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investigated the properties of objects that are
considered the same whenever one is a
continuous deformation of the other. Since
graph and shape grammars focus on
computation—that is, the generation of
geometrical objects—the resulting theory
could be a computational model with a subject
matter. That is, it would be more than a
“grammar” (a purely syntactic notion) but a
theory of what the grammar is “about,” just as
topology (on a nonformalist interpretation) is a
theory about topological spaces. Finger and
Dixon
survey
some
other
design
representations that might allow theoretical
treatment, such as representations that study
basic mechanical functions, how objects fit
together, and so on (Finger and Dixon 1989a,
1989b).
Empirical Theories of Design
The design theories so far suggested
have the character of mathematical theories,
but design could give rise to new empirical
theories as well. Suppose, for instance, that a
new state sets out to design its economic
system. Existing economies are generally
studied
by
investigating
equilibrium
conditions. But a designed economy may be so
heavily driven by tax incentives, regulations,
and social psychology that equilibrium is no
longer a useful idea, and new methods must be
developed. Predicting the behavior of an
incompletely described economy may require
a level of analysis unique to economic
planning.
Teleological Theories
Another important characteristic of
design is that it begins with a functional
description of what is to be designed. In fact
the functional description may become more
detailed as the design progresses. One may
begin by specifying that an automobile is to
serve certain purposes (commutation to work,
long-distance travel, off-road exploration, etc.)
and continue to develop the design by
specifying that part W will propel the car, part
E will power part W, part F will supply energy
to part E, and so on. This of course eventually
evolves to a physical description of the wheels,
engine, fuel system, and soon.
I have already said that since the
physical description of the artifact remains
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incomplete through most of the design
process, it may be useful to develop theories of
incompletely described objects. But if the
artifact is also described functionally through
much of the process, it may be equally useful
to develop theories of functionally described
objects.
The Nature of Teleological Theory
Teleological explanation may seem an
odd idea, due to the fact that “explanation” has
meant finding the “efficient cause” since the
advent of the modern era. We explain
something by telling what caused it, and the
paradigm case is that of one billiard ball
hitting another. But David Hume pointed out
long ago that there is no way in principle to
tell whether a billiard ball’s motion is caused
by its impact with another or simply coincides
with the impact. No amount of observation can
detect a cosmic glue that joins cause and
effect. What we call “causation” is actually an
ordering of our experience that helps make it
intelligible.
There are modes of explanation other
than efficient causation that are equally useful
for making the world intelligible and therefore
should be regarded as equally legitimate.
Aristotle recognized three others: material,
formal and teleological explanation. The last is
most relevant to design. Teleological
explanation orders experience by assigning a
purpose or function to its components.
Imagine for instance that someone is shown
drawings of human anatomy for the first time.
The complexity would be bewildering. But if it
is explained that this organ pumps a fluid that
supplies nutrients to the body, and this organ
converts food into those nutrients, and so on,
then the complexity quickly begins to make
sense. In fact, this is how we all first come to
understand human anatomy. Our grammar
school teachers tell us about the functions of
the organs, not about chains of chemical
reactions that explain the body in terms of
efficient causes.
Teleological theories also make testable
predictions. If we theorize that the function of
a certain gland is to regulate growth, we can
remove it and see if growth rate is affected.
This in fact illustrates how teleology supports
medicine. Medicine relies on a number of
supporting sciences, but the one that seems
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uniquely associated with medicine is a
teleological science of the human body. It is a
science that tells us what the body is supposed
to do and how to fix it when things go wrong.
It rests on such nonteleological sciences as
endocrinology and molecular biology but goes
beyond these to assign systemic roles to glands
and molecules. If the supporting science
uniquely associated with medicine is
teleological in nature, we might expect the
same of a uniquely supporting science for
design.
Teleological explanation is in fact
foundational for design but for a different
reason: since design moves from a functional
description to a physical description, and
refines the functional description as it
proceeds, the very act of design produces a
teleological explanation of the artifact. In
many cases the explanation is on a common
sense level and requires no refined scientific
treatment. But complex functionalities may
call for something more.
We have in fact a dual situation parallel
to that of theories of incompletely described
objects. On the one hand, modes of functional
representation may give rise to mathematical
or computational theories that investigate the
structure of “functional space” at a different
level of abstraction than required by the study
of existing objects. On the other hand, design
may require empirical theories in a teleological
mode that again call for a different level of
abstraction than the investigation of existing
systems.
Teleological Theories Arising from Functional
Representations
As for functional representations,
several systems have been proposed, at least in
the area of mechanical engineering. They
classify mechanical operations and to some
extent study how they interact. Suh, for
instance, proposed an “axiomatic treatment” of
functionality (Suh 1984, 1990). His treatment
seems aimed at making recommendations for
design, such as that of keeping functions
independent, but similar axiomatic treatments
could explore the structural properties of
functional representations.

Empirical Teleological Theories
An empirical theory along teleological
lines would be useful in the design of complex
systems, such as an ecological system, an
economy, or a community. Successful system
design may require teleological theories that
were never developed to study existing
systems. To design an ecosystem, for instance,
one might put a forest in one spot in order to
provide habitat for certain species, which is
needed to control other species, which must be
limited to protect certain vegetation, and so
forth, so that by the time the design is
complete, every significant feature of the
landscape has a set of functions. We now need
to know whether an ecosystem with these
interlocking functionalities can really exist.
Existing ecological science tells us something
about the function of different elements of an
existing system, but can it evaluate the
possibility of an imaginary configuration of
functions? This may require a systematic
teleological science that does not now exist.

CONCLUSION
There cannot be a science of design in
the same sense that there is a science of
chemistry, because design is a practice, much
as medicine is a practice. Praxis cannot be
reduced to theoria. Socio-psychological
theories of the design process can be useful but
are not design theories. The only sense in
which design theory or medical theory is
possible is as a supporting science uniquely
associated with design or medicine.
I have suggested two ways in which a
supporting science might be peculiarly suited
for design: (a) it explains and predicts the
behavior of incompletely described objects, or
(b) it is teleological in the sense that it explains
and predicts the behavior of functionally
described objects. The latter is already
exemplified by medicine, since the supporting
science uniquely associated with medicine is
arguably teleological in nature. Only small and
tentative steps have been taken, however,
toward an analogous science of design.
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